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The implications of downward nominal and exanterealwage rigidity,
andof wage contracting for the dispersion of relativewagechanges in the
presenceof price inflation are examined. Rigidity implies thatunexpected
inflation will raise the variability of relativewage changes; contracting
implies unexpected inflation reduces variability. Using dataon manufactur-
ing industries for 1955—81, and on private nonfarm industries for1965—81,
these hypotheses are studied. The dispersion in relativewage cnanges is
reduced by greater price inflation. Most of the reduction isa response
to unexpected inflation: Expected inflation has littleimpact on dispersion.
These findings hold for subperiods within thesample, and are robust to
different choices of measures of price expectations,including those of
the Livingston survey, the Survey Research Center householddata, and ARMA
forecasts. They stand in striking contrast to thecommonly accepted result
that price inflation is associated withgreater dispersion of relative price
changes. They suggest that inflation reduces the ability of relativewages





East Lansing, MI 48824I. Introduction
A vast array of studies has examined how the labormarket affects
inflation. In this study I reverse theprocess and examine how inflation
affects adjustment in labor markets.Similarly, a rapidly growing
literature has shown that inflation raises thevariability of relative
price changes, and has interpreted this findingas demonstrating the effects
of inflation on the allocative efficiency ofthe market mechanism. (See
Vining—Elwertowskj, 1976; Parks, 1978; Fischer, 1982; and Cukierman-
Wachtel, 1982.) The major empirical focus of thisstudy is an examination
of howinflationaffects the variability of relativewage changes.
With rare exceptions (Altonji, 1982, andBrown, 1982, are the best
examples) modern theories of macroeconomic adjustment havenot been tested
on the labor market; where they have, the examinationhas been restricted
to aggregate wage inflation or employment determination.So too, atheoretical
empirical studies of cyclical variation ininequality in wage levels are
legion (most recently, Wachter, 1970); andone study (Ashenfelter-Layard,
1983) correlated wage inflation with inequality in therate of wage increases.
Nonehas made a study of the determinants ofinequality in relative wage
changes comparable to the studies of relativeprice changes, and none has
usedempirical work on inequality in rates ofwage changes to examine the
validity of theories of macroeconomic adjustment.
In Section II I outline how changes in therate of price inflation
affect relative wage adjustment under twoalternative theories of the
determination of relative wage changes. The firstis a simple Keynesian
notion of downward wage rigidity; the second isbased on notions of wage
contracting. The implications of these adjustment mechanisms-for the
effects of inflation on inequality of relativewage changes are drawn out.2
In Section III, I test the implicationsfor inequality of relative wage
changes on two different data sets.In addition to providing evidence on the
validity of these theories, the tests providea new, strongly—supported fact
describing the adjustment of labor markets.This result stands, moreover,
in surprising contrast to results othershave obtained on the effects of
price inflation on the distributionof relative price changes.
II. Theories of Adjustment and Relative Wages
Throughout this section I base thediscussion on a standard model of
wage determination:
(1)w=p+yp+ay.,
where i is an economic subunit; w isthe instantaneous rate of wage increase;
e and are the instantaneous rates of expectedand unexpected aggregate
price inflation; y. is the nominalrate of change of excess demand in thei'th
sector, deflated by p; andandare parameters, <1.This general
model can be modified to analyze the effectsof alternative assumptions
about wage determination.
A. A Simple Keynesian Assumption
Perhaps the essence of Keynesian adjustmentis the assumption of
downward nominal wage rigidity. How does priceinflation affect adjustment
in the labor market under this assumption? Rees(1970) has claimed, "A
gently rising price level will lubricaterelative price changes...
Tobin (1972) argues that inflation is beneficialin improving matches
between workers and jobs. These views areconsistent with the casual
observation that inflation enables firms to providereal rewards to those
whose productivity is increasing while cuttingreal rewards to those who
are becoming less productive without reducingtheir nominal wages. We. modify
(1) by assuming further that y is a randomvariable with some distribu-
tion function, G(y), and density function, g(y),and that:—3—
(2) w1 =max{e + u +,
Thismodification means that wage increases are either e+ + or
zero, with = if <_(e + ,rpU)/a = Theaverage wage increase
in the economy is then:
(3) w =c;[e+ +ay] g(y)dy =[l_G(y*)]A+ a f*yg(y)dy,
where A =e+
The variance in the rate of increase inmoney wages across subunits
is:
(4) Var w. =f[A+ ay —w}(y)dy+ w2G(y*).
Letting a1 temporarily to simplify the arithmetic, anddifferentiating
in (4) with respect to A, one can show that:
Var w./A =2G(y*)[l_G(y*)]w*,
where w is the mean increase in those subunits with positive (nonzero)
wage changes. Since A increases with both e and p's, the variance of
money wage changes will be increased as price inflation mitigates the effect
of nominal wage rigidity. Moreover, the effect of expected price inflation
will be greater than that of unexpected price inflation, for
If inflation does make labor markets work more efficiently by allowing the
effects of variations in y. to be reflected in wage changes, we should observe
a positive relation between the variance in wage changes and the rate of
price inflation. This positive relation will be greater for expected than
for unexpected inflation.
One might argue that the form of rigidity rn (2) characterized well a
world in which inflation was rare, but is a poor characterization of a world
in which price changes are generally positive. One might modify (2) by replac-
ing the zero with pe; this respecification implies that all workers receive
a wage increase at least equal to the expected rate of price inflation.—4—
Though hardly a Keynesian assumptionit is in accord with notions ofreal
wage rigidity (thoughit implies exante rather than post aggregatereal
wage
rigidity))' Under such a modification of (2) the conclusionabout the
effect of expected price inflation onthe variance of wage changes isaltered.
Expected price inflation has noeffect on the variance of wage increases
across economic units (sinceall workers receive at least e and changesin
do not affect the fraction of workerswhose wage increases are constrained
to be no greater thane)However, as before, increases inu raise the
fraction of workers whose wage changesexceed pe; thus unexpected inflation
increases the variance of changesin relative wages.
Both specifications imply that priceinflation will affect the ability
of relative wages to allocate labor amongfirms. In the specification
embodied in (2) both unexpected and expected price
inflation increase the
effects of differences in excessdemand among firms on differences in wage
changes. To the extent flowsof labor respond to relative wage changes, more
rapid inflation will"lubricate" the market, causing both outputand employment
to be greater. Exant real wage
rigidity will obviate the beneficialeffect
of expected inflation on relative wages,and thus on allocation of labor; but
more rapid unexpected inflation
will still improve the allocation oflabor
through its effects on relative wagechanges.
C. A Contracting Approach
Stated very succinctly, an increase in wagecontracting——an increased
reliance upon pos changes in priceinflation in setting wages——alters (1)
by increasing y and reducing ct.In the extreme case of complete indexingwith
industry conditions not affecting wagedetermination at all, l and ci. =0.
Assuming that greater uncertainty,denoted by u, affects these wage—setting
parameters in this manner, (1) canbe rewritten:—5--
(1') w =
e
+ Y(U)Pu + a(u)y. ,y'> 0, a'0
Taking variances across industries in (1'):
(5) Var w.[()]2 Vary..
Taking logarithms in (5) and linearizing:
(6) log (Var w.) =log(Var y) + -
a1
U
This derivation is, unfortunately, completely mechanical.The reason why
y>O is given by Gray (1978), who shows that increaseduncertainty about
inflation makes more indexing optimal, The otherpart of the issue is why
optimizing agents might choose to rely more on wage indexation and lesson
the vicissitudes of the market for goods or servicesthey are producing.
One can rationalize this by considering the worker ina typical industry
who must purchase a market basket of goods, theprice of which is
increasing at a rate p, but whose wage, according to (1), ispartly
determined by y.. Let the average perceived correlationbetween p and y.
be denoted byr0. At the uncertainty denoted by this correlation, the
average worker will Supply labor to the average industry for combinations
of indexed wages and a risk premium,contingent upon y.,, no worse than
those combinations shown by the frontier Uin Figure 1. The frontier
r0
slopes down because workers require a greater risk premiumto forgo
indexation; it is convex because, the less security workers derivefrom
indexation, the greater the incremental risk premium requiredto leave the
workers no worse off.
in competitive product markets employers must offer workersa
combination of indexation and risk premiums along U .Forthe typical
r0Wage Indexing
6—




employer, the best combinations of indexation andriskpremiums that are
consistent with obtaining workers are shown by theisoutility of profits
curve 10 in Figure 1. Lower curves are more desirable to theemployer.
The curves slope downward: Larger premiuTmsobviously reduce profits, while
greater indexation reduces profits if it is associated withmore frequent,
costly wage adjustments.
One of the effects of increased uncertaintymay be to decrease the
correlation workers perceive between p andy.,. The lowered correlation,
to r1, causes the utility frontier U in Figure 1 to become flatterat any
combination of indexation and wage premium. So longas workers are risk
averse, the increased uncertainty reduces their willingness to trade off
indexed wages which protect their purchasingpower for additional
contingent risk premiums.
The typical worker's utility frontier rotates to U Assuming
r1
product markets are competitive and employers are riskneutral, the optimal
contract moves to point B, with a greater relianceon indexing and lessened
reliance on payments based on conditions in the individualproduct market.-"
This change implies that y in equation (I') will increaseand a decrease
as the extent of uncertainty rises.
C. Summary of Implications
The two approaches carry specific andcontrasting implications for the
effects of inflation on the variance of relativewage changes. These are
summarized in Table 1. Absent any good definition of whatuncertainty
about inflation means, we assume thatunexpected inflation is one proxy
for the extent of that uncertainty; another is discussedin Section III.
If we make this assumption, the implications ofcontracting for the—8—
variance of relative wage changes are quite differentfrom those of the
hypotheses involving some form of wage rigidity.Thus an examination of
the effect of price inflation on the dispersion of wage changes provides
evidence on whether inflation does aid labor markets towork more
efficiently.
Table 1.Summary of Hypotheses
Var w.
:i
e U Effectof: p p
1.a. Nominal Wage Rigidity + +
b. Ex ante Real Wage
Rigidity 0 +
2. Contracting 0 —
III.The Variability of Relative Wage Changes
To capture expectations about inflation I use the Livingston surveyof
economists, most of whom were in private industry (Carlson, 1977);the
Survey Research Center survey of a random sample ofhouseholds (Juster-
Comment, 1980); and ARNA forecasts of inflation. The Livingston surveysare
taken semiannually in June and December, wheninformation about the CPI through
April and October respectively isavailable. Accordingly, I let each observa—
tion be a half year, January—June and July—December.e for the first (second)
half year is the average from the Livingston surveyin the previous December
(June). Pu is the difference between actualinflation and e The Livingston
survey asks questions about expectationsof inflation over the next six and
twelve months. I use both sets of data,and compute the p' corresponding to
each series by taking the most recent six ortwelve months of changes in the
CPI. Thus, for example, the observation Pu for the second half of 1981—9—
using six—month inflation expectations is the difference betweenthe
annualized rate of change in the CPI between April 1981and October 1981,
and the June 1981 average response in theLivingston survey.
The SRC data were collected quarterly
through 1979, monthly since then.
I use the second and the fourth quarters'observations to correspond to
the June and December data from theLivingston survey before 1980, and
use the May and November data for 1980 and 1981.Inflationary expectations
are also calculated based on continuously—updatedforecasts from an ARNA
3/ (5, 1) process.—
It is unclear what are the appropriateproxy variables for greater
uncertainty about inflation. Lacking any theory of what isa good measure
of this type of uncertainty, I experiment withalternative proxies. Included
among these are Pu and the variances among the respondents inthe Livingston
and the SRC surveys of the estimates of therate of inflation.
Equation (6) suggests that a measure of thedispersion of changes
in output across sectors be includedalong with measures of inflation or
inflation uncertainty as independent variablesin estimating equations
describing the variance in relative wage changes.Expecting that periods of
incomes policy would produce reductions in theinequality of relative wage
changes, I also add dummy variables for the period ofthe Kennedy—Johnson
wage—price guideposts and the Nixon controls to theseequations. Since the
latter were statistically insignificant and didnot affect the other parameter
estimates, they were deleted from theequations. The guidepostvariable, G,
takes the value one from 1962through the first half of 1966. The basic
equation to be estimated is:
(7) log (Var w) =
y)+4G+s—10—
where is a disturbance term.
The equations to be estimated in this section arebased on two
different sets of data. The first covers mostof the private nonfarm
economy. The seven sectors areconstruction and mining; finance,
insurance and real estate; services; wholesaleand retail trades transpor-
tation and public utilities; durable manufacturing,and nondurable
manufacturing.' Except for the twomanufacturingsectors, the data on
hourly earnings needed to construct Var w. areonly available since 1964;





whereWI is the ratioof average hourly earnings (adjusted for overtime)in
sector i to a weighted average of earnings amongthe seven sectors, and E.t
is the i'th sector's share of total employmentof production workers at
time t. The series on Va w is shown in thefirst column of Table 2; there
is no obvious trend in it. Var is constructed analogously using data
on nominal national income by sectordeflated by an appropriate price
index .'
Thesecond data set covers twenty two—digit manufacturingindustries
(all of manufacturing except ordinance) for1955—81. Var w is calculated
as in (8), based on the average hourly earningsof production workers by
industry. The series is listed in column (2)of Table 2; like Var w for
the private nonfarm economy, it too shows no particulartrend. The variance
of changes in output is an emp1oyment-weighted averageof changes in the
Federal Reserve Board's index of industrial production.All the models are
estimated using the maximum likelihood method of adjustingfor serially—11—
correlated errors proposed by Beachand Mackinnon (1978).
Table 3 presents the estimatesof equations describinglog (Var wt) for
the private nonfarmeconomy; Table 4 presents the sameequations estimated
for manufacturing. In eachtable columns (l)—(3) listparameter estimates
based on six—month inflationrates and the Livingston six—monthinflation
forecasts; columns (4)—(6) listestimates using twelve—monthLivingston
forecasts and price changes;columns (7) and (8) use the SRCdata, and
columns (9) use the ARMA forecasts.
Comparing the estimates in column (1)
in each table to those incolumn (2) (or the estimates incolumn (4) to
those in columns (5), (7) and(9)), one sees clearly that,no matter which
sectors, price expectations or inflationhorizon is used,accounting for
inflationary expectations improves theability to track variations in the
dispersion of relativewage changes. The adjusted 2 isgreater in each
equation that decomposes price inflationinto expected andunexpected
components. Actual inflation alone reducesdispersion in both samples,
though not significantly so in the datafrom manufacturing. Ifone ignores
inflationary expectations, though,one would fail to capture themechanism
through which inflation affects the
dispersion of wage changes.
The most important findingsare contained in columns (2),(5), (7)
and (9) of each table. In each
sample, for each inflation horizon andfor
each series on price
expectations unexpected price inflationproduces a
significant jye effect on thedispersion of wage changes.Expected
inflation has no significant
impact on dispersion except for theARNA
forecastsin Table 3 (though the
coefficients on Pu and e aredifferent
from each other fairly at lowlevels of significance_l.9>/t/>12)
Both
results accord fully with theimplications of thecontracting hypothesis
outlined in Section II,
assuming uncertainty about inflation isrelated—12—





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to unexpected inflation. The negative effect of Pusharply contradicts
the notion that inflation allows wage changes to reflect real factors more
closely: More rapid price inflation compresses wage changes. Perhaps the
onlysupport for the hypothesis of downward nominal or ex ante real wage
rigidity is that the impact of eismore positive than that of USincethe
latter's impact is negative, and since e has no effect, this is awfully weak
support.It seems fair to conclude that, though the results do not (indeed,
could not) disprove the existence of downward nominal or ex ante realwage
rigidity, they suggest very strongly that such rigidity describes wage—setting
since the l950s in the United States very badly.
Estimates of the equations describing the log variance ofrelative
wage changes that include measures of the dispersion of forecasts
of inflation are presented in columns (3), (6) and (8) ofTables 3
and 4. Only in those equations for manufacturing industries inwhich
the Livingston expectations data are used does the variance of
inflation forecasts induce a significant reduction in thedispersion
of relative wage changes (though the coefficients arenegative in
the other four cases). While providing somesupport for the con-
tracting hypothesis, these equations clearly are less successful
than those that include the actual rate of inflation or itsdecomposi-
tion into expected and unexpected inflation.Given the difficulty of
identifying proxies for uncertainty about inflation,one might infer that
both sets of results support thecontracting hypothesis.
The results on the effect of expected andunexpected inflation
stand in sharp contrast to those in the literaturethat examines the
role inflation plays in affecting variation inrelative prices. As
Parks (1978) has shown for relative pricevariation, I have shown that—16—
variation in relative wage changes is unaffected by anticipated inflation.
The dispersion diminishes with unexpected inflation in prices, while the
literature suggests relative price variability increases with unexpected
inflation. The diminution in relative wage increases can be viewed as
a reduction in the ability of relative wages to reflect variations inthe
relative demand for lab.or by sector. Thus, following Friedman's (1977)
argument that inflation reduces the ability of relative prices to function
as allocative signals, the results here suggest that it does so by
compressing relative variation (in this case, relative wage variation)
rather than by widening it. That studies of relative price variation fail
to find this compression may be due to misspecification——their failure to
include measures o variation in the relative demand for commodities.
An increase in the variance of changes in output produces the expected
positive effect on the dispersion of relative wage changes. This impact
is significantly positive for nearly all formulations of the estimating
equation anddatasets. It implies that the failure to include changes in
relative demand when examining the effect of price inflation on the
dispersion of wage (or price) changes will produce an incomplete descriptIon
of the underlying process. The other variable in the equations, a dunimy for
the Kennedy—Johnson wage—price guideposts, sharply reduced the variability
of wage changes. The reductions were roughly 50 percent from the rest of
1965—81 in the private nonfarm sector, and were 60 percent in manufacturing
from the rest of 1955—81. That the reduction was greater within manufacturing
than within the nonf arm sector is consistent with the guideposts' focus on
the larger firms in manufacturing.
A number of alternative specifications of the equations in Tables 3
and 4 were estimated, each embodying some alternative variable correlated—17—
Table 5. Dispersion of Relative Wage Changes,One—Digit Industries,
1965—1973:1, 1973:2—1981
Livingston, Livingston, Survey Research
Six-Month Twelve—Month Center ARMA
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1965—1973:1
e
.006 .086 -.017 .027 (.02) (.24) (—.07) (.14)
Pu -.084 -.018 .016 —.045
(—.63) (—.09) (.08) (—.20)
—.149 —.179 —.183 —.174
1973:2—1981
e
.004 .062 -.023 -.066
(.06) (.87) (—.39) (—1.20)
u -.161 -.205 -.156 —.215
(—4.12) (—3.39) (—2.51) (—2.68)
.527 .369 .279 .479—18--
Table 6. Dispersion of Relative Wage Changes,
Manufacturing Industries, 1955—1973:1, 1973:2—1981
Livingston, Livingston, Survey Research
Six-Month Twelve—Month Center ARMA
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
1955: 1—1973:1
e —.031 —.042 —.097 —.109
(—.30) (—.41) (—1.18) (—1.46)
Pu —.124 —.219 —.205 —.217
(—1.79) (—2.12) (—2.00) (—1.92)
.311 .303 .272 .296
1973:2—1981
e —.089 —.074 —.088 —.084
(—3.10) (—1.75) (—2.36) (—4.00)
u
—.103 —. 110 —. 100 —. 180
(—3.99) (—2.63) (—2.02) (—4.26)
.715 .538 .514 .738—19—
with unexpected inflation and thusperhaps accounting for the surprising
results obtained here. Forexample, one might expect that more widespread
unionization would reduce the variationin relative wage increases,as union
wage bargains focus less on labor—marketconditions than does nonunionwage—
setting Ameasure of the fraction of the work forceunionized did not
affect the coefficients on theinflation terms in theequations, nor did
the extent of unionism affect
relative wage variability.Similarly, a
greater prevalence of indexed labor
contracts might be expected toaccount
partly for our results, because morerapid inflation leads to greater
indexation.However, when the fraction of the work forcecovered by
cost—of—living escalators was included,only a slight reduction in the
estimated impact of unexpected inflation occurred.2'The results in Tables
3 and 4 are also robust to theinclusion of the rate of change ofan index
of average wage increases. Thisshould increase one's confidence inthe
results as reflections of increasedindexing, rather than as partial reflec-
tions of other conditions in the labormarket. A catch—all time trendwas
also added to the equations; it too hadlittle effect on the estimated
effects of inflation, nor was the trenditself significant.2P-'
The structure of most industrial
economies was sharply affected by
the rise in energy prices in theearly l970s, as indicated by atemporary
increase in the extent of structural
unemployment (Lilien, 1982). This
important change maybeaccounting for our results: The reducedvariability
ofrelative wage changes that we have shownis associated with more rapid
inflationmay be a reflection of the simultaneous rapidchange in relative
factor prices instead. To examine thisthe basic equation was reestimated
for the semiannual periods through thefirst half of 1973, and from the
second half of 1973 through 1981. Parameterestimates of the variables of—20—
interest in (8) are presented in Tables 5and6.
As the Tables show, even during the post—OPEC period unexpected inflation
reduced the variability of relative wages. Anticipated inflation had
little effect on the dispersion of relative wage changes in the data for the
private nonfarm sector, but did have significant effects on dispersion
within manufacturing. The results for the period before 1973 are very weak
for the private nonfarm sector, perhaps because of the narrow range of
observations on rates of anticipated and unanticipated inflation between 1965
and 1973. For manufacturing, on which a longer time series of data are
available, the results for the first subperiod are qualitatively similar to
those in Table 4.Indeed,despite the apparent differences in some of the
coefficientsbetween the subperiods, we cannot reject any of the hypotheses
"- aboutpooling the data for these subperiods.—
Table7presents the means andextreme values of the series on price
inflation (expected and unexpected). The ranges of p'' are quite large.
Applying them to the estimated responses of the dispersion of relative wage
changes demonstrates that they produce effects that are substantial as well as
significant. In the private nontarm sector the dispersion was between 61
and 68 percent lower (depending upon the equation used) at the peak rate
of unexpected inflation compared to the lowest rate; in manufacturing the
comparable range of effects is between 42 and 54 percent.
V. Conclusions
This study demonstrates the existence of a striking relation of the
response of labor markets to price inflation. The variabilityof relative
wage changes decreases when price inflation accelerates. Thedecrease is
mainly a response to unanticipated inflation; anticipated inflation has
little impact on the dispersion of changes in relative wages. The results
are quite robust with respect to changes in the sample period, the measures—21—
ue Table 7. Descriptive Statistics, p,p,1955—1981
1965—1981 1955—1981
Period Mean Minimum Maxitnuma Mean Minimum
Data
Livingston, 6-month
Pu 1.89 -1.42 5.92 1.49 -1.42
e
4.87 .94 10.68 3.33 .07
Livingston, 12—month
Pu 1.66 —.66 5.17 1.29 —.66
e
4.96 1.07 10.27 3.42 .00
Survey Research Center
u
.66 -1.85 4.54 .45 —1.85
e
5.96 2.52 11.40 4.27 -.24
ARMA
u
.20 -3.99 1.98 .23 -3.99
e
6.41 .93 15.36 4.49 —.18
aThe maximum values for 1955—1981are identical to these, except that max (pU)
for the ARMA forecasts was 2.30.—22—
of anticipated and unanticipated inflation, and the choice of sectors over
which the measures of dispersion are calculated.
The negative relation between unexpected inflation and the dispersion
of relative wage changes is quite inconsistent with the notion that inflation
allows labor markets to work more smoothly by ameliorating the impact of
downward nominal wage rigidity. Rather, the finding can be interpreted as
implying that unexpected inflation reduces the responsiveness of relative
wages to changes in real factors. This implies that unexpected inflation
hinders the ability of wages to allocate labor among industries in response
to changes in relative demands. The finding is consistent with the role of
increased uncertainty affecting workers' desires to minimize risk in implicit
wagecontracts. It is also consistent with workers entering the lab or—
market in response to unanticipated increases in nominal wages (Lucas—Rapping,
1969) and supplying their labor to industries where demand is growing most
rapidlyand thus where relative wages would be rising most rapidly if the
size of the labor force remained unchanged).-'
Inflation does not have the desirable side—effect of enabling employers
torestructure relative wages more rapidly than otherwise in order to
reflect changes in relative demand. Quite the contrary: Relative wage
rigidityis increased by inflation. We have attributed this to workers'
seeking to reduce fluctuations in their purchasing power by linking wage
increases more closely to aggregate price changes than to changes in excess
demand in their industry. The increase suggests that one cannot point to
the labor market as a sector of the economy whose functioning is improved
by price inflation.—23--
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FOOTNOTES
1. Sachs (1979) presents evidence on theimportance of real wage rigidity
during the l970s in a number of industrialized countries.
2. The assumption of risk—averse workers andrisk—neutral firms has been
used in the contracting literature by,among others, Azariadis (1975).
So long as the degree of relative risk aversionamong workers exceeds that
among employers, the result in the text will hold.
3.This process implies 2=1/2years of lagged terms. Experiments ith longer
lags never yielded higher R2.
4. The data used to calculate Varw1 and Var y are taken from the CITIBASE
data file.
5.To deflate the nominal flows of national income bysector, I use: For
construction and mining, the implicit price deflator for privatenonresidential
structures; for services, and for finance, etc., the CPI—U for services,
excluding rent; for wholesale and retail trade, the producer price index
for all commodities; for transportation and publicutilities, the implicit
price deflator for personal consumption expenditures ontransportation; and
for manufacturing, durable and nondurable, therespective implicit price
deflators for personal consumption expenditures.
6.Including c e in the equations in columns (2), (5) and (7) in Tables
3 and 4 changesthe results little. The significance ofthe terms in p
decreases very slightly; that of p declines even further belowwhat is
shown in the Tables; and the dispersion ofexpected inflation itself produces
the same negative, though generally insignificant effecton the logarithm of
the dispersion of relative wage changes.
7.Relatively greater reliance on price changes than on unemployment in
wage—setting in unionized industries is demonstrated by,among others,
Hamermesh (1970).
8. Between 1957 and 1981 the fraction ofworkers in the U.S. who were
covered by a negotiated cost—of—living clause ranged from .027to .069. The
highest values occurred in 1958—1959, and in 1975—1977; both areperiods
that followed an acceleration in the rate of inflation.
9. The small effects on the parameter estimates do notcontradict the
of our application of contracting to the determination of
relative wage changes. Only a tiny fraction of workersare covered by
formal indexation. Our argument and, indeed, the wholecontracting
literature applies to implicit arrangements. Thus the mostone can do by
accounting for the fraction of workers covered by escalator clauses is to
limit the data to the overwhelming majority of the work force whosewages
may be affected by implicit contracting.—26—
10. Also, tests of Granger and Sims causality in each sample and for each
measure of pu could not reject the hypothesis that it is exogenousin the
equations presented in Tables 3 and 4.
11. None of the F—statistics testing the correctness of pooling exceeds 1.6,
and most are below one. With the degrees of freedom implied by the sample
size and the number of regressors, none comes anywhere near to being significant
at even the 10 percent level.
12. While this is possible, the underlying requirement——that workers supply
labor elastically in response to transitory changes in perceived real wages——
is not supported by the data (see MaCurdy, 1981).